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It is a standard assumption that proper names for entities of different types have the very same 
semantics, denoting well-individuated entities and thus classify as count nouns. It has 
moreover become a standard view in philosophy of language that names are rigid designators 
standing for the same entities in different circumstances in virtue of the causal-historical 
change to which they belong on a given use. A view that is less standard, argued for by 
philosophers such as Geach (1957) and Dummett (1973), is that names involve a sortal, as a 
requirement for a speaker to be able to use them to refer to an entity. This paper presents 
syntactic evidence from German for the presence of sortals in names, and argues that different 
types of names may involve sortals of different kinds and in different ways. 
      One manifestation of that is a surprising division into mass and count among names in 
German. Names for places as well as what I will call ‘productive names’ for times, numbers, 
and expression types in German show diagnostics for mass rather than count (diagnostics not 
available in English). Making use of Kayne’s (2005, 2010) silent-noun theory, the paper will 
argue that this is due to the silent presence of mass light nouns in such names, in particular 
THING, PLACE, and TIME. THING, PLACE, and TIME also behave as mass nouns when 
they are overt or silent parts of light quantificational or  pronominal NPs in German or 
English, for example everything or its German counterpart  alles. By contrast, the light noun 
PERSON classifies as count, being a silent part of names for people and an overt or silent part 
of light quantificational or pronominal NPs such as everybody (or German jeder) and many. 
The classification of German names as count when they contain the silent noun HOUSE 
further supports a mass-count distinction among light nouns. 
      Names for people and places as well as productive names for times, numbers, and 
expression types are to be distinguished as type 1 names (as I will call them) from type 2 
names such as the Hudson River or the Parthenon. Type 2 names, which in German include 
names for mountains, lakes, temples, and famous stones, do not involve a light noun. Rather, 
they come with a more specific overt or silent sortal and the definite determiner and as a 
consequence classify as count. 
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     In addition to arguing for the involvement of light nouns in names, the paper will shed new 
light on light quantifiers such as something and everything, which play a significant role in 
philosophically relevant contexts. 
     The paper will first establish a range of generalizations about light nouns as part of 
quantificational and pronominal NPs in English and German. It will then present the empirical 
generalizations about German type 1 names that are indicative of a mass-count distinction 
among light nouns and, more briefly, discuss the role of sortals in type 2 names.  An appendix 
will critically review a potential alternative explanation of the mass behavior of the relevant 
German names, namely the predicativist theory of names, on which names as common nouns 
could divide into mass and count. 
 
1. Light nouns and light quantifiers 
 
This section will present a range of syntactic and semantic generalizations about light nouns, 
regarding their characteristic syntactic properties, the ability of the light noun THING to stand 
for absolutely everything, mass or count, and the selection of different light nouns by different 
quantifiers or determiners in English and German.  
       Light nouns play a particular role in certain types of quantificational NPs and pronouns. 
In English, these include everybody, everything, someplace, and sometime. Here -body, -thing, 
-place and –time are light nouns, overt versions of the light nouns PERSON, THING, 
PLACE, and TIME (Kayne 2005).
1
 Where in everywhere may seem like a light version of PLACE 
as well; however, following Kayne (2010, chap. 5), where is better regarded a determiner combining 
with the silent noun PLACE or THING (more on that later). In English ‘bare’ occurrences of little, 
much, more and a lot as  well as the pronoun that contain silent THING.
2
  There are also 
quantifiers that select PERSON rather than THING, for example bare occurrences of many 
and few, on a non-anaphoric use, as in Many / few believe in god. Quantifiers and pronouns 
thus may (or may not) select particular overt or silent light nouns. In some languages, light 
nouns never appear overtly in light quantifiers. This is the case in German (jeder ‘everybody’, 
                                                            
1 Everyone, noone, someone etc involve a numeral one, again not a noun. Note, however, that one in that context 
appears to carry the feature [+human], which suggests that one has come to act as a realization of the light noun 
PERSON. 
 
2 For some reason, a little bit does not easily take silent restrictions. John said a little bit is quite bad (as opposed 




alles ‘everything’, nichts ‘nothing’). Everybody, everything, someplace, sometime, little, and 
much thus can be called light quantifiers.      
         Light nouns form a special class of nouns in that they belong to the functional rather 
than the lexical part of grammar. As such they have various special syntactic properties. Most 
importantly, light nouns can stay silent in the absence of an antecedent (Kayne 2005).  By 
contrast, full NPs can be silent only through ‘deletion under identity’, that is, in the presence 
of a linguistic antecedent or possibly a salient object in the discourse. The difference between 
light NPs and full NP in that respect can be illustrated by the different readings of many and 
too much in many believe in god, John bought many, and John bought too much, which differ 
in the kind of silent nouns they contain as below: 
 
(1) a. Many PERSON believe in god. 
     b. John bought many N. 
     c. John bought too much THING. 
 
Many in (1a), which involves the light noun PERSON, ranges over human beings in general, 
not requiring an antecedent. Many in (1b) by contrast, requires an antecedent in the preceding 
discourse (e.g. in the question Did John buy any books?), and thus involves a deleted full 
noun. Too much in (1c) does not require an antecedent and involves the light noun THING. 
     In addition to not requiring an antecedent, NPs headed by light nouns, light NPs (DPs), 
tend to display different syntactic movement behavior, often having to move to a higher 
position (SPEC) position, when full NPs can stay in place (Collins 2005, Kayne 2005). 
Finally, light nouns do not display the syntactic features of full nouns; in particular they lack 
gender features (see below) and show a peculiar behavior with respect to number. Yet, as we 
will see, they display the mass-count distinction.
3
  Semantically, the functional status of light 
nouns means that their range and content should not vary across languages, but rather is part 
of a universal inventory, being constitutive of the core of grammar. 
      Light nouns may come with homophonic full nouns. Though there are generally semantic 
and perhaps historic connections between the two, the light noun and the corresponding full 
noun need not share their meaning or even their syntactic features. Thus, the light noun -body, 
                                                            
3 On one view, the mass-count distinction consists in a distinction in functional projection, the presence of 
absence of a classifier (Borer 2005). This view would be untenable if light nouns display a mass-count 
distinction, yet are unable to participate in functional projections (Collins 2005). On the more standard view, 




an instance of the light noun PERSON, contrasts with the full noun body. The difference 
between light nouns and homophonic full nouns is particularly striking with the nouns –thing, 
the overt version of the light noun THING, and thing, the full noun The light noun –thing 




(2) a. something nice 
     b. some nice thing 
 
There are a range of semantic differences between the full noun thing and the light noun –
thing. Thing is a count noun, which applies to an entity by way of contextually given 
individuation conditions (which is why it is often called a ‘dummy sortal’, Griffith 1977). 
Thing applies only to inanimate enduring objects, in fact usually material objects. The light 
noun -thing applies to individuals as well as stuff, and thus, seems to act both as a count noun 




(3) a. John ate something, an apple. 
     b. John ate something, brown rice. 
     c. John drank something, lemonade. 
(4) a. Mary bought something nice, bath salt / chocolate / an art book.  
     b. Mary bought a nice thing, an art book / * bath salt / * chocolate.
6
 
                                                            
4 It has been argued that –thing in (1a) has moved to a higher syntactic position, leaving a prenominal adjective 
in place (Kishimoto 2000). See, however, Larson/Marusič (2004) for arguments that the adjective is in fact in 
postnominal position. 
 
5 The overt light noun thing displays a syntactic count feature not shared by THING, which explains why thing 
can appear with every and is excluded in *littlething, *morething. This, however, is an uninterpreted 
syntactic feature. In section 4, we will see that –thing always applies as a mass noun, even if it 
introduces a countable domain. 
 
6 A referee has pointed out that certain count NPs are possible in such contexts, for example those with present 
and drink as head nouns: 
 
(i) a. Mary bought a nice present for her mom, bath salt. 
    b. Mary drank a drink she likes, lemonade. 
 
Those count NPs are also possible in predicative position with mass NPs in subject position, on a generic, type-
referential reading: 
 
(ii) a. Bath salt is a nice present for girl. 





Furthermore, -thing applies to abstract objects of all sorts and not just material entities:  
 
(5) a. John admired something about the stone, its color. 
     b. John admires something particularly, namely courage and integrity. 
(6) a. John added two to eight, so he added something to eight. 
      b. ‘Rouge’ means something, namely ‘red’.  
 
The light quantifier something can even range over pluralities, thus acting as a genuine plural 





(7) a. John ate something, the ten cookies. 
     b. I brought you something, a cup, a plate and a fork. 
 
In fact, -thing-quantifiers can be used so as to range over absolutely everything and are 
typically used in statements of absolute generality (Rayo/Uzquiano 2007): 
 
(8) a.  Are there quantifiers ranging over absolutely everything? 
      b. Nihilists doubt the existence of everything there is. 
      c. The world is everything there is. (Wittgenstein) 
 
In certain contexts –thing is restricted to inanimate objects (?? John saw something, namely 
Mary). This can be explained as a blocking effect, given the availability of the more specific 
somebody in the very same sentential context. That is, if for an expression X, the language 
contains an expression Y with a more specific meaning than that of X, then the choice of X 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
However, these are not counterexamples to the view that –thing being able to act as a mass noun:  there is 
something special about count nouns present and drink and that is that they convey countability based on 
function rather than inherent properties of the entity being described (e.g. having a boundary or other form of 
unity). As such, functional count nouns of this sort present significant challenges to received views of the mass-
count distinction that are based on mereological properties of entities. But they do not present a challenge to the 
present argument, that something has mass uses. Note that other count nouns that convey countability based on 
the inherent unity of an entity, such as object or entity, are equally impossible in contexts such as (ii) and (ii): 
 
(ii) ??? John bought an object / an entity, bath salt. 
 
7 The existence of plural quantifiers in natural language has, incorrectly, been put in question by some 




instead of Y indicates that X is to be understood with a meaning complementary to that of Y. 
The light noun THING thus is the most general noun, applying to anything whatsoever.  
     There are certain argument positions in which only light NPs, not full NPs may appear. 
Some of them are of considerable interest philosophically, in particular the complement 





(9) a. John said something nice / * some nice thing. 
     b. Mary thought / assumed something / * some thing.  
     c. John became something admirable, a hero / * some admirable thing. 
     d. John is looking for something, an assistant / * for some thing, an assistant. 
 
For that reasons such quantifiers have been considered non-nominal quantifiers (Rosefeldt 
2008). While that label is obviously incorrect syntactically, the syntactic category distinction 
between light NPs and full NPs is yet to be explored for the semantics of nonreferential 
complements.  
     It has been proposed that light nouns come with no syntactic features or functional 
projections (Collins 2004). This certainly holds for gender features. Light nouns lack the 
gender features of full nouns, as can be seen in the absence of gender agreement of the 
apparent feminine light noun with the adjective in French (quelque chose de bon / * de bonne) 
and Italian (qualcosa du buono / * di buona), as well as in the obligatory neuter gender of 
adjectives modifying PERSON light NPs in German (niemand interessantes / * interessanter / 
* interessante ‘noone interesting (neut) / interesting (masc) / interesting (fem)’).  Given that 
light nouns are not marked for gender, a modifying adjective needs to take neuter, that is, 
unmarked gender. 
     Light quantifiers ranging over locations have the syntactic peculiarity of not requiring or 
even allowing a spatial preposition in particular cases: 
 
(10) John worked (*at) someplace. 
 
                                                            
8 See Moltmann (2003, 2013a) for a discussion and semantic analysis of light quantifiers as ‘special’ or 




In the literature, this is generally accounted for by having someplace move to SPEC(P), 
allowing the P to stay empty (Collins 2005, Kayne 2005, Terzi 2010a, b). This means that 
where, when, somewhere, every etc. are PPs, not NPs. 
    There are pronouns corresponding to light quantifiers, namely that, what, who, where, and 
when. That and what are pronominal counterparts of something, which means they are able to 
in principle stand for anything whatsoever. This is most obvious in the use of what in 
questions, which allow as answer the mentioning of anything whatsoever, as long as permitted 
by the presuppositions of the predicate: 
 
(11) What did John see? He saw Mary. 
 
That, what, who, where are best not considered light nouns themselves, though. Thus, Kayne 
(2010, chap. 5) has argued that where is in fact a determiner combining with the silent noun 
PLACE or THING, so that (11a) is in fact (11b): 
 
(12) a. John went where Mary went. 
        b. John went where-PLACE Mary went. 
 




     In German, the counterpart of where, wo is more obviously able to combine with THING: 
in relative clauses modifying THING-NPs, wo rather than was (as a relative pronoun, see 
below) appears with prepositions (in fact, postpositions then) (Noonan 2017): 
 
(13) a. alles / nichts, wovon / womit / worüber / * von was / * mit was / * über was 
           ‘everything / something where of / where with / where over’ 
        b. etwas / das, wovon / * was von / * von was / ?? von dem 
            ‘everything / nothing / something / that what of / of what of which 
  
Similarly, da appears as counterpart of das ‘that’ with pepositions (davon ‘of that’, darüber 
‘about that’, damit ‘with that’). Where and wo/da thus are determiners able to combine with 
both light nouns PLACE and THING.  
                                                            




     As was mentioned already, in contrast to English, German light quantifiers do not involve 
an overt light noun. Alles, etwas, nichts are THING-quantifiers, and thus their actual structure 
will be [alles THING], [etwas THING], and [nichts THING]); jeder, niemand, jemand are 
PERSON-quantifiers. Alles as a THING-quantifier is as potentially unrestricted as English 
everything. Light nouns, in their overt or silent versions, thus are selected by particular 
quantifiers or pronouns. 
 
2. W-pronouns in German 
 
German light quantifiers and pronouns show a peculiarity that is particularly important in the 
context of this paper. This concerns the choice among two sorts of relative pronouns: 
[1] w-pronouns, which consist of the neuter pronouns was and wo  




There are some contexts for which the choice of D-pronouns and w-pronouns varies among 
speakers and there are subtle semantic parameters that seem to be at play. However, the 
following generalizations capture stable intuitions (Brandt/Fuss 2017, 2019). In general NPs 
with full nouns as head chose D-pronouns, illustrated below just with a neuter noun (Objekt), 
as was is neuter:
11
  
                                                            
10 The choice among d-pronouns and w-pronouns has been described by various early German grammarians, 
such as Behagel, Curme, and Cutting; see Brandt/Fuss (2017, 2019) for detailed references. 
 
11  Nominalized superlative adjectives also take w-pronouns rather than w-pronouns: 
 
(i) das Beste, was / * das 
    ‘the best that’ 
 
Brandt/Fuss(2017) argue that this is due to an implicit alles (which selects w-pronouns) in superlatives (the best 
= better than everything). 
     For at least a range of speakers, including myself, mass NPs that are not definite also select or at least prefer 
d-pronouns: 
 
(ii) etwas / alles Wasser (mass, neut.), was / ?? das mit Rosenöl vermischt ist, 
      ‘some / all water that is mixed with rose oil’ 
 
For such speakers, NPs such as all das Wasser ‘all that water’ permit both w-pronouns and d-pronouns, with the 
former obviously being selected by all and the latter by das: 
 
(ii) all das Wasser, was / das er trinkt 
     ‘all that water that he drinks’ 
 






(14) Maria nahm jedes / ein / kein Objekt, das / * was sie fand. 
         ‘Mary took every / some / no object that she found.’ 
 
By contrast, neuter light quantifiers and pronouns such as alles ‘everything’, das ‘that’, nichts 




(15) a. Alles, was / * das  Hans besitzt, ist schoen.           
          ‘Everything / Nichts / That, which John owns is beautiful.’ 
        b. Etwas, was / * das Hans aergert, ist der Laerm. 
           ‘Something that bothers John is the noise. 
       c. Nichts, was / * das Hans sagte ist wahr. 
           ‘Nothing that John said is true.’ 
      d. Hans sagte mir nichts, wovon / ?? von dem ich nicht schon wusste’. 
          ‘John told me nothing of which I did not know already.’ 
      e. Das meiste, worüber / ??? über das er sprach, war uninteressant. 
          ‘Most, which / about which he talked was uninteresting.’ 
 
Not all light NPs select w-pronouns, though. Those with the light noun PERSON, in 
particular, don’t: 
 
(16) a. Jeder / niemand / jemand, der / * was mich kannte, kam. 
           ‘Everybody / nobody / somone, who / what knew me came.’ 
       b. Jeder, von dem / * wovon / * von was Maria gesprochen hatte, kam. 
           ‘Everyone, of whom / where / what Mary had talked about, came.’ 
 
                                                            
12 Light adverbial pronouns and quantifiers involving TIME and PLACE such as dann ‘then’ and irgendwo 
‘somewhere’ chose w-pronouns: 
 
(i) a. Hans kommt dann, wenn er will / zu dem er will. 
          John comes then, when : at which he wants 
        ‘ John will come when we wants. 
   b. Maria ist irgendwo, wo / * an dem die Sonne schein. 





The difference between light nouns and full nouns is evident also when contrasting neuter 
pronouns with silent light noun and silent full noun in the example below from Brandt/Fuss 
(2017, p. 212): 
 
(17) a. Das Bild, das Peter gekauft hat, war teurer als das N, das Maria gekauft hat. 
          ‘The picture that Peter has bought is more expensive than that that Mary has bought.’ 
        b. Das Bild, das Peter gekauft hat, war teurer als das THING, was Maria gekauft hat. 
           ‘The picture that Peter has bought is more expensive than what Mary has bought.’ 
 
(17a) compares the picture Peter bought to the picture Mary bought; (b) compares it to the 
things Mary bought. 
       The standard view about the choice relative pronouns in German is that the choice of w-
pronouns is subject by an elsewhere conditions: w pronouns are chosen just in case the 
conditions for d-pronouns are not met, namely that the head noun be gender-marked 
([+masculine], [+feminine], [+ neuter] (= [- masculine, - feminine])) (Brandt / Fuss 2017, 
2019 and references therein). The latter is the case for full nouns as well as 
jeder/jemand/niemand etc. This view poses difficulties for the view that light nouns, as was 
said, do not carry gender features. THING, TIME, and PLACE not being marked for gender 
leads to a default classification as neuter. But this does not apply to PERSON, which selects 
d-pronouns. I will argue that what distinguishes PERSON from the other light nouns is its 
status as noun ranging over a countable domain.  This requires a modification of the 
elsewhere condition on w-pronouns as follows: 
 
(18) Condition on the choice of German relative pronouns (d-pronouns and w-pronouns) 
         D-pronouns appear with head nouns carrying the feature [+masculine], [+feminine],  
          [+ neuter], or [+count], W-pronouns appear elsewhere. 
 
I will turn to the count/non-count status of light nouns after a discussion of a related 
phenomenon, the support of plural anaphora. 
 
3. Plural anaphora in English and German 
 
The selection of w-pronouns by light nouns goes along with a failure to support plural 
anaphora. This requires a few words about plural anaphora in German and in English and an 
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important difference among them. The plural anaphor sie in German generally requires 
antecedents that are syntactically plural, as in (19a, b). By contrast, English they allows for 
antecedents that are syntactically mass, though semantically plural, namely in particular 
conjunctions of mass NPs, as illustrated by the acceptable English translations of (19a, b): 
 
(19) a. Hans hat Mehl und Reis gekauft. Er hat * sie / ok es / das / ok beides bezahlt. 
           ‘John bought flour and rice. He paid for them / it / that / both.’ 
        b. Maria hat das Silber und das Gold betrachtet. Sie hatte * sie / ok es noch nicht  
            gesehen. 
           ‘Mary has looked at the silver and the gold. She had not seen them / it before.’ 
       c. Der Regen und der Schnee, Maria hat beides / das / * sie gesehen. 
           ‘The rain and the snow, Mary has seen both / that / them.’ 
 
Instead of the plural pronoun sie, German allows only for es ‘it’, das ‘that’ or beides ‘both’, 
which is syntactically singular (mass), yet behaves like a plural semantically.
13,14
 
      Let us assume that plural pronouns are in fact determiners, as suggested in Kayne (2010), 
following Postal (1966). Then plural determiners they / sie select semantic plurality in 
English, but syntactic plurality in German. Below this is made more precise, using the notion 
of an integrated whole (Simons 1987, Moltmann 1997), a notion of unity of entities that is 
independent of syntactic singularity: 
 
(20) a. For a discourse context c and a NP X, [they X]
c
 is defined only if an utterance of X is  
            part of c and the semantic value of X is a plurality of integrated wholes. 
        b. For a discourse context c and a NP X, [sie X]
c
 is defined only if X is part of c and  
            [+plural]. 
 
Referents of singular count NPs are generally integrated wholes, but also referents of definite 
mass NPs are, such as the silver. The silver is an integrated whole in the sense that it is the 
maximal entity (in the context) whose parts share the property of being silver (Simon’s 1987 
notion of an FF-integrated whole, see also Moltmann 1997). 
                                                            
13 See Moltmann (ms.) on beides. 
 
14 Somewhat colloquial German also allows for die ‘the / they’ in the contexts (19a, b). Die is homophonous with 
the plural determiner and also acts as a demonstrative without linguistic antecedent. I take die to be a plural 
demonstrative, referring to a contextually given plurality, not a pronoun. It is thus not subject to the condition on 
pronouns in German below. 
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      Why do English and German differ with respect to the antecedents of plural anaphora? 
This appears related to the fact that gender features are determined syntactically in German 
and semantically in English. In German, gender as a syntactic feature of nouns is fixed in the 
lexicon, rather than being based on the nature of the referent, as in English.
15
 German 
personal pronouns (er ‘he’, sie ‘she’, es ‘it’) and determiners (der, die, das), moreover, 
require syntactic agreement with the gender of the relevant NP. (20b) is then part of a more 
general condition according to which German pronouns select NPs based on syntactic features 
of the corresponding antecedents:
16
   
 
(21) Condition of English and German anaphoric pronouns 
        a. For an English pronoun p, an NP X, and a discourse context c, [p X]
c
 is defined only if  
            an utterance of X is part c and the semantic value of X satisfies the features of p. 
        b. For a German pronoun p, an NP X, and a discourse context c, [p X]
c
 is defined only if  
            an utterance of X is part of c and X agrees in syntactic features with p. 
 
      What is important in the present context is the observation that conjunctions of light NPs 
that select w-pronouns also fail to support plural anaphora, as seen in (22a, b):
17
 
                                                            
15
 Uses of she / her for ships in English may be set aside as peculiarities of the individuation of certain artifacts. 
 
16 As a referee pointed out, they/them may take someone / a student as antecedent in colloquial, recent English. 
On this use, they/them seems to have lost its plural feature, exploiting the fact that the plural does not come with 
gender in English. 
 
17 Bare mass nouns as names of kinds in German also require w-pronouns (for the relevant range of speakers, see 
Fn 5.): 
 
 (i) a. Magnesium, was / ??? das lebenswichtig ist, ist ein wichtiges Metal. 
         ‘Magnesium, which is essential for life, is an important metal.’ 
      b. Reis, was / ??? der gesünder ist als Weizen, is nicht teuer. 
         ‘Water (masc), which is healthier than beer, is not expensive.’ 
 
    Moreover conjunctions of bare mass nouns in their kind-referring use do not support the plural anaphora: 
 
(ii) a. Gold und Silber werden zum Schmuckherstellen verwendet. * Sie glänzen. 
         ‘Gold and silver are used to make jewelry. They are shiny.’ 
      b. Magnesium und Eisen sind lebenswichtig. Jeder braucht * sie / ok das. 
        ‘John needs magnesium and iron. Mary needs them / that / that. 
 
Bare mass nouns remain mass NPs even if they refer to a unique, well-individuated kind. 
   Note that even kind-referring mass NPs of feminine or masculine gender take w-pronouns (for the relevant 
range of speakers), as see in the inflection of the adjectival modifier below: 
 
(iii) a. Brauner Reis, was / ??? der gesünder ist als Weizen, ist nicht teuer. 
          ‘Brown rice, which is healthier than wheat, is not expensive.’ 




(22) a. Hans kann sich an das erste und das zweite erinnern, was Maria gesagt hat. Max kann  
            sich daran / * an sie auch erinnern. 
            ‘John can recall the first thing and the second thing Mary said. Max can recall them /  
             that.’ 
       b. Hans kann sich an das erste und das zweite Ding erinnern. Max kann sich an sie auch  
            erinnern. 
            ‘John can recall the first thing and the second thing. Max can recall them too.’ 
(23) Hans hat etwas gebaut und Maria hat etwas gezeichnet. Peter hat (das) beides  / * sie  
        bewundert. 
       ‘John has built something and Mary has drawn something. Peter has admired (that)  
         both / them.’ 
 
(22a) contrasts with (22c), with the full noun Ding, which goes with d-pronouns and supports 
plural anaphora.  
      Light nouns that select w-pronouns thus fare with mass nouns in their failure to support 
plural anaphora. This indicates that the light noun THING sides with mass nouns, rather than 
with count nouns, or, more carefully, have ‘non-count status’.  In the next section we will 
further arguments for the non-count status of THING as well as of the light nouns TIME and 
PLACE. This will then play an important role in explaining the behavior of German names 
with respect to relative pronoun selection and plural anaphora support.  
 
3. The non-count status of the light nouns THING, TIME, and PLACE 
 
Light nouns do not come with a syntactic mass-count distinction that with full nouns is to an 
extent arbitrary, reflecting at best ‘grammaticized individuation’ (English shoes – footwear,  
rice grains - rice) (Rothstein 2017).  Rather the status of a light noun as count or non-count is 
strictly determined by semantic criteria. Given such criteria, PERSON obviously classifies as 
count, but not so THING, TIME, and PLACE.  
      First of all, we have seen that there are both mass and apparent count uses of THING. 
Though the light noun –thing contrasts with the full noun thing, which only has a count use, 
                                                                                                                                                                                          





there are apparent count use of –thing as well. –thing in fact comes with a plural, as in several 
things. Several things can appear in context in which only light NPs can appear, such as the 
object position of a verb of saying: 
 
(24) a. He said something nice. 
       b. ??? He said some nice thing. 
       c. He said several nice things. 
 
Syntactically, though, the plural things behaves like the full noun thing, with the adjective 
preceding the noun. German, which lacks an overt version of the light noun THING, forms a 
plural of THING using the plural of the full noun Ding, but with the light-noun meaning of 
THING: 
 
(25) a. Er hat etwas / * ein Ding gesagt. 
          ‘He said something / a thing.’ 
       b. Er hat mehrere Dinge gesagt.  
           'He said several things.’ 
 




      THING-quantifiers in German also appear to have singular count uses, as is apparent with 
cardinal or ordinal numerals in eines ‘one’, das eine ‘the one thing’, and das erste ‘the first’: 
 
(26) a. Hans hat eines vergessen, dass er ein Visum braucht. 
          ‘John forgot one thing, that he needs a visa.’ 
       b. Das eine, was Hans vergessen hat, ist, dass er ein Visum braucht. 
          ‘The one thing that John forgot is that he needs a visa.’ 
       c. das erste, was Maria gesagt hat’ 
          ‘the first thing Mary said’ 
                                                            
18 Other languages do not seem to display a syntactic difference between singular and plural of THING. For 
example, the French light noun chose and the Italian noun cosa have count uses and a plural from the same 
paradigm (plusieurs choses ‘several things’, molte cose ’many tings’). This indicates that light nouns do not as 





Thus, THING, in English and in German, has both mass and count versions and a plural 
borrowed from the full noun homophone. 
    There is something special, however, about the count use of THING, and that is that 
THING, on that use, does not need to pick up on any inherent countability of an entity, unlike 
the singular full count nouns thing and Ding. Rather, THING, on a count use, may impose 
countability on things that are not as such countable, e.g. the referents of mass or plural NPs. 




(27) a. Hans hat eines / ??? ein Ding nicht gegessen, die Bohnen (plur) / den Reis (mass). 
          ‘John failed to eat one thing, the beans / the rice.’ 
       b. Das eine / ??? Das eine Ding, was Hans nicht mag, sind Bohnen (plur) / Reis (mass). 
          ‘The one thing John does not like is beans / rice.’ 
 
On such a count use, the light noun THING can even count a plurality of two entities as one, 
unlike the full noun Ding: 
 
(28) a. Das eine / einzige / ??? eine Ding / ??? einzige Ding, was Maria vergessen hat, waren  
            die zwei Taschen. 
           ‘The one / only thing that Mary forgot were the two bags.’ 
       b. Ich habe Maria an das eine / das einzige / ??? eine Ding / ??? einzige Ding erinnert, das  
           sie vergessen hatte, die beiden Taschen im Schrank. 
           ‘I reminded Mary of the one thing / the only thing she forgot, the two bags in the  
           closet.’ 
 
THING contrasts in that respect with the light singular count noun PERSON, which cannot be 
used to refer to a plurality of people, as the impossibility of the collective predicate below 
makes clear: 
 
(29) ??? Everyone / Someone met in the room. 
 
                                                            
19 The ‘reifying’ function of THING can certainly be related to the nominalizing function of THING-quantifiers 
when they occur in place of nonreferential complements, such as that-clauses, predicative complements, and 
complements of intensional transitive verbs, as discussed in Moltmann (2013). 
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On such singular count uses, THING acts like a numeral classifier in classifier languages, on a 
view such as that of Rothstein (2017), mapping a domain not specified for countability onto a 
countable one. That is, THING imposes countability by picking up on a distinguishing 
property of elements of the domain, whether they are stuff or things. THING is then both 
mass and count in the sense that it applies to a domain not specified for countability and may 
map it onto one that is. Given that, the selection of w-pronouns by THING-quantifiers can be 
attributed to the mass status (on one side) of (singular) THING.
20
  
    Apart from the behavior of THING with mass nouns, there are general philosophical 
reasons to regard the light noun thing as a mass noun: generally, counting requires a sortal, 
giving the identity conditions of the things being counted (Frege 1884). Given that view, there 
could not be a count predicate for everything there is. This appears to be reflected also in the 
fact that count quantifiers such as many, few, and a few do not allow for THING as restriction, 
but only for the light count noun PERSON, or else a deleted full noun, requiring an 
antecedent (Section 1.). 
    The light noun TIME is clearly non-count semantically, as its overt counterpart time is a 
mass noun. There are a number of reasons to consider it a non-count noun [+count]. First of 
all, its manifest version as in someplace does not come with a plural (Collins 2007). Yet 
someplace / somewhere can appear in contexts where a plural would be strongly preferred. 
Thus, if John and Mary live in different places in Europe, (30a) is still acceptable, but not so 
(30b), as opposed in (30c): 
 
 (30) a. John and Mary live somewhere in Europe. 
       b. John and Mary live in some place in Europe. 
       c. John and Mary live in some places in Europe. 
 
The light noun PLACE satisfies standard semantic criteria for mass nouns (Pelletier/Schubert 
1989, 2003): it is cumulative (the sum of two places is again a place as well as divisive: a part 
of a place is a place again). Even apart from standard extensional mereological criteria for 
mass nouns, there are fundamental ontological differences between places and individuals, 
which rank places below the level of individuals in terms of degrees of individuation and 
motivate a classification of PLACE as non-count. Thus, Strawson (1959) distinguishes a 
                                                            
20 There is also a view on which the mass-count distinction is a binary distinction, but may involve various 
criteria (Kulkarnik/Rothstein/Treves 2020). Different criteria may then fail to classify THING and PLACE 




conceptually (and perhaps developmentally) earlier stage of the use of language, namely as a 
feature-placing language. A feature-placing language does not involve reference to 
individuals, but only the placing of a feature (quality) at a location. Locations thus are prior, 
conceptually and possibly developmentally, to individuals. Individuals that are material 
objects are individuated in terms of persistence conditions across different locations and at 




     To summarize, light nouns come with a mass-count distinction which is strictly grounded 
in semantic or ontological properties of their denotations, with only PERSON having the 
status of a count light noun (as well as the light noun HOUSE, as we will see in the next 
section). 
 
4. Type 1 names in German: names for people, buildings and places 
 
German names exhibit a remarkable pattern in the selection of w-pronouns and plural 
anaphora, displaying a sharp divide between person names on the one hand and place names 
on the other. In addition, ‘productive’ names for times, numbers and expressions side with 
names for places. 
     There are two types of proper names that need to be distinguished, for German as well as 
English and similar languages: type 1 names and type 2 names, as I will call them. Type 1 
names take the form of simple nouns in argument position (English John or London).
22
 Type 
2 names require a determiner in argument position (English the Hudson, the Parthenon).  
      In German, type 1 names for people and type 1 names for places (cities, villages, 
countries, and continents) differ with in two respects: 
[1] selection of relative pronouns: d-pronouns (der, die, das) or w-pronouns (was, wo) 
[2] plural anaphora support by a conjunction of proper names as antecedent.  
                                                            
21 The full noun place is a count  noun of the sort fence, wall, and entity, nouns that satisfy mereological criteria 
for mass nouns, yet are count (Moltmann 1997, p. 22, Rothstein 2017). With the full noun place,it is the 
contextually given boundary or integrity of a place that ensures countability. 
 
22 I will not make any particular assumptions about the syntactic structure of type 1 names. See Longobardi 
(1994) and subsequent work for a discussion of the syntax of type 1 names. On Longobardi’s view, names move 
to D position (possibly only at LF). Head movement to D will no longer be available on the view developed here 
on which type 1 names come with a silent light noun that forms the head of the DP. However, movement of the 




The choice of d-pronouns strictly goes along with support of plural anaphora, whereas the 
choice of w-pronouns goes along with the failure to support plural anaphora.
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     Here are the relevant generalizations regarding person names. Proper names for people 
(and animals) select d-pronouns: 
 
(31) a. Hans, der / * was 
           ‘John, who’ 
        b. Maria, die / * was 
           ‘Mary, who’ 
 
Not only masculine or feminine names select d-pronouns, also diminutive names, which are 
syntactically neuter, do so: 
 
(32) a. Er zeigte uns Fritzchen, das / * was wir noch nicht gesehen hatten. 
          ‘He showed us little Fritz, whom we have not seen.’ 
       b. Mariechen, das / * was wir sehr gerne mögen, kann uns helfen. 
         ‘Mariechen, whom we like a lot, can help us.’ 
 
There are also proper names for inanimate objects that select d-pronouns, for example proper 
names for castles and churches: 
 
(33) a. Sanssouci, das / ?? was kleiner ist als Versailles 
            ‘Sanssouci, which is smaller than Versailles’ 
        b. Zarskoe Selo, das / ?? was grösser ist als Pavlovsk 
            ‘Zarskoe Selo, which is bigger than Pavlovsk’ 
       c. Notre Dame, das / ?? was beinahe durch ein Feuer zerstört wurde 
           ‘Notre Dame, which was almost destroyed by fire’ 
 
                                                            
23 The generalizations hold at least for standard German spoken in Southern Germany. For some German 
speakers the choice of d-pronouns and w-pronouns is interchangeable for place names as well as in other 
contexts. 
    A certain regional and colloquial German allows for definite determiners with names (der Hans ‘the Hans’, 
die Maria ‘the Mary’). However, there does not seem to be a correlation of the use of definite determiners with 




Names for castles and churches are syntactically neuter. This is shown by the fact that a 
definite determiner that is required by an adjectival modifier of the name must be neuter (and 
that regardless of the gender of a suitable sortal noun (Kirche ‘church’ is feminine and Palast 
‘palace’ masculine): 
 
(34) a. das / * die schöne Notre Dame 
           ‘the beautiful Notre Dame’ 
        b. das / * der erstaunliche Zarskoe Selo 
           ‘the amazing Zarskoe Selo’ 
 
Neuter gender here is chosen based on the nature of the referent.   




(35) a. München, was / ??? das ich sehr gut kenne 
           ‘Munich, which I know very well’ 
        b. Ich kenne Berlin, was / ??? das du ja nicht kennst. 
           ‘I know Berlin, which you do not know.’ 
        c. Ich liebe Italien, was / ??? das dir ja auch gut gefällt. 
           ‘I love Italy, which pleases you too.’ 
(36) a. Ich kenne Australien, was / ??? das du ja nicht kennst. 
           ‘I know Australia, which you do not know.’ 
        b. Asien, was / ??? das weit grösser also Europa ist 
            ‘Asia, which is by far bigger than Europe’. 
 
The same contrast holds for complex relative pronouns of the sort wovon ‘of which’, as 
opposed to von dem ‘of which’: 
 
(37) a. Berlin, womit / ?? mit dem ich mich schon seit langem befasse, ist ein interessantes  
                                                            
24 There is one type of exception to the generalization for those speakers and that is plural country names such as 
die Niederlande ‘the Netherlands’, which selects d-pronouns: 
 
(i) die Niederlande, die  
    ‘the Netherlands, which’ 
 
Here the sortal appears overt (–lande), and the name may better be classified as a type 2 names, which come 




           Thema für eine Konferenz. 
          ‘Berlin, with which I have occupied myself for a long time, is an interesting topic for a  
            conference.’ 
     b. England, wovon / ?? von dem er eine Stunde lang sprach 
         ‘England, of which he spoke for an hour’ 
     c. Afrika, worüber / ?? über das wir uns lange unterhalten haben 
        ‘Africa, which we talked about for a long time’ 
 
    Turning then to plural anaphora, in German, as in English, conjunctions of proper names 
for people are unproblematic as antecedents for plural anaphora sie: 
 
(38) Anna mag Hans und Franz. Bill mag sie auch. 
       ‘Ann likes Hans and Franz. Bill likes them too.’ 
 
The same holds for names for churches and palaces: 
 
(39) a. Ich kenne Notre Dame und Sainte Chapelle. Sie sind beide sehr schön. 
           ‘I know Notre Dame and Sainte Chapelle. They are both very beautiful.’ 
        b. Zarskoe Selo und Pavlovsk, sie befinden sich in der Nähe von Sankt Petersburg. 
           ‘Zarskoe Zelo and Pavlovsk, they are located in the environment of Saint Petersburg.’  
 
    By contrast, conjunctions of German names for places do not support plural anaphora. 
Rather, for the purpose of anaphoric reference to a conjunction of place names, a definite 




(40) a. Ich kenne Berlin und München. Anna kennt ?? sie / ok diese Städte auch. 
           ‘I know Berlin and Munich. Ann knows them / them / those cities too.’ 
        b. Ich mag Frankreich und Italien. Marie mag ?? sie / ok diese Länder auch 
           ‘I like France and Italy. Mary likes them / those countries too.’ 
 
Conjunctions of close appositions with place sortals as head nouns do support plural 
anaphora, as expected: 
                                                            




(41) Ich kenne die Stadt Berlin und die Stadt München. Maria kennt sie auch. 
       ‘I know the city of Berlin and the city of Munich. Mary knows them too.’ 
 
    The conditions on plural anaphora support are different in English. Conjunctions of English 
place names are unproblematic as antecedents for plural anaphora: 
 
(42) a. I know Berlin and Munich. Mary knows them too. 
       b. I like France and Italy. Mary likes them too. 
       c. I would like to visit Australia and Africa. Mary would like to visit them too. 
 
    Only in certain larger constructions can German place names go with d-pronouns and 
support plural anaphora. One of them is close appositions, where the d-pronoun is selected by 
the full head noun, with which it agrees in gender: 
 
(43) a. die Stadt München, die /* was ich gut kenne 
            ‘the city of Munich which I know well’ 
        b. Die Städte München und Berlin, ich kenne sie gut. 
           ‘The cities Munich and Berlin, I know them well.’ 
 
Another construction involves temporal modification: 
 
(44) das Berlin der 20iger Jahre, das / * was ich nicht kenne 
      ‘the (neut) Berlin of the 20ies which I do not know well’ 
 
Here the proper name, most plausibly, has undergone meaning shift from a name referring to 
a place to a noun expressing a sortal concept for temporal stages of the place. The sortal noun 
is count, allowing for the plural, as in die Berlins der verschiedenen Epochen ’the different 
Berlins of the different periods’. 
    Why do place names in German select w-pronouns and fail to support plural anaphora? 
Given the previous section, NPs that select w-pronouns and fail to support plural anaphora are 
those that involve as head a light noun that is non-count, such as THING.PLACE, we have 
seen likewise can be regarded as non-count. German place names themselves can hardly be 
considered non-count, since they stand for single, well-distinguished entities. Cities, 
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countries, and continents are clearly countable, or at least they are treated as such in the way 
we ordinarily think and talk about them. The classification of German place names as non-
count, however, can be attributed to the presence of a silent PLACE. The light noun PLACE, 
like THING, is a mass noun, contrasting with PERSON. If silent light nouns form part of type 
1 names, this explains the difference in count status between names for places and names for 
people in German.
26
 A silent light noun thus should form the head of a type 1 name, as below, 
determining the count status of the entire DP: 
 
(45) a. [Hans [PERSON]Nlight]NlightP]DP 
       b. [Berlin [PLACE]Nlight]NlightP]DP 
 
English type 1 names will have the very same structures. English differs from German just in 
that English plural anaphora allow antecedents that are semantically, but not syntactically 
plural. 
      A syntactic question that arises for type 1 names is: why do type 1 names not come with 
the definite determiner? This question needs to be pursued properly somewhere else. Perhaps 
the answer may reside in the ability for type 1 names (as light DPs) to move to SPEC(D) 
position, allowing the determiner to stay unpronounced, as has been proposed for light DPs in 
general by Collins (2007).  
    Names for churches and palaces will involve a light noun that, like PERSON, classifies as a 
count noun. It is plausible that HOUSE is such a light noun. HOUSE in various languages 
functions as a bare NP, a syntactic role close to that of a light noun  (Collins 2007), for 
example Italian (Sono a casa ‘I am home’, Vado a casa ‘I go home’) and French (à la maison 
‘at home’).
27, 28
 Thus, Sanssouci will have the structure [Sanssouci HOUSE]NlightP. 
 
5. Productive names: names for times, addresses, numbers, and expression types 
 
                                                            
26 For the suggestion that light nouns are part of names see Kayne (2010, Chap 8, Appendix).   
27 Collins (2007) has argued that home has a light noun use, involving PRO for the relevant possessor ([PRO 
home]). However, it is more plausible that home has in fact the underlying structure [PRO HOUSE]. Many 
languages, it seems, do not have a light noun home, but use the noun for ‘house’ instead (Italian a casa, German 
zu hause). Alternatively, some languages just use pronoun or name with a preposition (French chez soi ’at 
(one’s) home’, chez Marie ‘at Mary’s home’)). 
 
28 Note that overt house can be used to refer to churches, e.g. English, house of god,  German Gotteshaus ‘house 
of god’, Italian casa del Signore ‘the house of the lord’.  
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I will call productive name those names that are attributed not arbitrarily, based on some form 
of baptism or otherwise case-by-case, but instead by a scheme aligned with a productive 
formation of names applied to a particular domain of entities. Productive names generally 
take w-pronouns and do not support plural anaphora, which means they contain non-count 
light nouns. 
     Names for times (years, specific months, or dates) are productive names involving a 
combination of numerals and names for recurring periods of time in a certain order. German 
names for times take w-pronouns and do not support plural anaphora: 
 
(46) a. 1968, was / ?? das interessanter ist als 1970 
           ‘1968, which is more interesting than 1970’ 
        b. 1968, worüber / ?? über das ich einen Artikel geschrieben habe 
            ‘1968, about which I have written an article’ 
 
 A close apposition is required to make d-pronouns acceptable for names of times: 
 
(47) a. das Jahr 1968, das interessanter ist als 1970, … 
           ‘the year 1960, which is more interesting than 1970, …’ 
       b. die Jahre 1968 und 1970, ueber die ich einen Artikel geschrieben habe 
           ‘1968, about which I have written an article’ 
 
German names for times also fail to support plural anaphora, unlike their English counterpart 
(as the translations of the examples below make clear): 
 
(48) a. Ich habe an 1968 und 1970 gedacht. Maria hat auch an * sie / ok diese Jahre gedacht. 
           ‘I have thought about 1968 and 1970. Mary thought about them / those years too.’ 
       b. Anna schlug den dritten und den vierten August vor. Maria schlug * sie /ok diese Tage  
            auch vor. 
           ‘Ann proposed the third and the fourth of August. Mary proposed them / those days  
            too.’ 
 
Names for years, days, or months as such could hardly classify as non-count, since they stand 
for well-individuated temporal units and are part of a conventionalized schema for naming 
them in a certain order.  The non-count status of names for times, however, can be attributed 
24 
 
to the presence of the light mass noun TIME.
29
 TIME as part of a name does not tell whether 
the referent is a year, month, or day. However, the choice of a particular temporal unit as the 
referent of the name will be part of the naming scheme that goes along with the particular type 
of productive name.  
      Names for addresses are productive names referring to places. They select w-pronouns 
and fail to support plural anaphora: 
 
(49) a. 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, was / * das die Adresse des Weissen Hauses ist 
            ‘1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, which is the address of the White House’ 
       b. 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue und 10 Downing Street, ich merke mir ??? sie / ok diese  
           Adressen. 
         ‘1600 Pennsylvania Avenue und 10 Downing Street, I will recall them / those  
            addresses.’ 
 
This is obviously due to the presence of the light mass noun PLACE in names for addresses. 
Recall, by contrast, that names for buildings (churches, palaces) involve the light count noun 
HOUSE and thus are not categorized as place names. 
      Names for numbers are also productive names, being formed by nominalizing the 
corresponding numeral adjective (or numeral quantifier). Number words such as two can 




(50) Two is smaller than four. 
 
German names for numbers take w-pronouns and do not support plural anaphora: 
(Moltmann 2013a, Chapter 4, 2013b):
31
 
                                                            
29 One might suggest that 1968 is in fact accompanied by both TIME and YEAR. However, there is little 
plausibility that YEAR is non-count. Note that the full noun year has not just a count noun use, but also a use as 
a measure noun (as in for several years). 
 
30 Moltmann (2013a, b) and Hofweber (2006) take simple numerals to still have adjectival or quantificational 
meaning. But see Moltmann (2017) for arguments that their syntactic status is that of a name and no longer that 
of an adjective or quantifier. 
 
31 German number words may also enter the construction of type 2 names, which, as expected, go along with d-
pronouns: 
 
(i) die Zwei, die / * was eine Primzahl ist 





(51) zwei, was / ?? das kleiner als vier ist, … 
       ‘two, which is smaller than four, …’ 
(52) a. Hans addierte zehn und zwanzig. Maria addierte * sie / ok diese Zahlen auch. 
           ‘John added ten and twenty. Mary added them too.’ 
        b. Zehn und zwanzig sind durch zwei teilbar. * Sie / OK Diese Zahlen sind keine  
            Primzahlen. 
            ‘Ten and twenty are divisible by two. They / Those numbers are not prime numbers.’ 
 
 The non-count status of number names can be attributed to the presence of the light mass 
noun THING.
32
 Conjunctions of number words in English do support plural anaphora, as 
shown by the acceptability of the translations of (52a, b), due to the fact that plural anaphora 
in English require just semantic plurality, not syntactic plurality, for their antecedents.  
     Another productive type of name is pure quotations (in contexts in which they act as 
referential terms). Pure quotations are uses of expressions that appear to involve the formation 
of expression-referring names, at least in contexts such as the subject position in (53a) and the 
object position in (53b) (which allow replacement by an explicit expression-referring term of 




(53) a. ‘Anna’  ist zweisilbig. 
           ‘Anna’ is disyllabic.’  
        b. Hans buchstabierte ‘Anna’. 
           ‘John spelled ‘Anna’.’ 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
In (i), the feminine gender of die matches the feminine gender of the unpronounced sortal Zahl. Such type 2 
number names are restricted to relatively low numbers, a constraint that does not hold for  close appositions with 
an overt head: 
 
(ii) a. die Zehn,?? die Zwanzig, ??? die Dreiundzwanzig, ??? die Hundert 
         ‘the ten, the twenty, the twentythree, the hundert’ 
     b. die Zahl dreiundzwanzig, die Zahl hundert 
         ‘the number twentythree, the number hundert’ 
 
English does not have type 2 number names (just as it does not have type 2 names for lakes). 
 
32 One might think that number names contain a silent light noun NUMBER. NUMBER, however, is less 
obviously mass since it comes with the plural, at least in English (enormous numbers of, Kayne 2005, p. 182). 
 
33 Pure quotations as they occur in (53a, b) differ from pure quotations as small-clause predicates of verbs of 
calling and in as-phrases, where they act predicatively rather than referentially, see the Appendix. 
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German pure quotations in contexts as in (55a, b) take w-pronouns rather than d-pronouns: 
 
(54) a. ‘Anna’, was / * das der Name dieser Frau ist, ist zweisilbig. 
            ‘Anna, which is the name of this woman, is disyllabic.’ 
        b. Hans buchstabierte ’ich’, was / * das ein Pronomen ist. 
           ‘John spelled ‘I’, which is a pronoun.’ 
 
Moreover, conjunctions of pure quotations in German do not support plural anaphora: 
 
(55) a. ‘Anna’ und ‘Marie’ sind zweisilbig. ??? Sie sind nicht dreisilbig. 
           ‘’Anne’ and ‘Marie’ are disyllabic. They are not trisyllabic.’ 
        b. Hans schrieb ‘Ich’ und ‘Du’ an die Tafel. ??? Bill schrieb sie auch an die Tafel. 
           ‘John wrote ‘I’ and ‘You’ on the blackboard. Bill wrote them on the blackboard too.’ 
 
    German pure quotations thus pattern with mass NPs, which would be puzzling given the 
nature of expression types. However, the non-count status of pure quotations can be attributed 
to the presence of the light noun THING in pure quotations when they occur as expression-
referring names. 
      As the translations of (55a, b) illustrate, conjunctions of pure quotations in English do 
support plural anaphora, which again is due to the fact that English plural anaphora require 
semantic plurality, not syntactic plurality. 
 
6.  Type 2 names in German: names for mountains, lakes, temples, and stones 
 
Type 2 names display a different syntactic structure from type 1 names. Type 2 names involve 
a more specific, full sortal noun, which generally can appear overtly, as well as the definite 
determiner, which needs to agree with the sortal. German makes use of the construction of 
type 2 names for names for mountains, lakes, temples, and famous stones; other languages 
may make other choices. Below are examples with German names for mountains: 
 
(56) a. der Mont Blanc, der 
        b. die Zugspitze, die 




In type 2 names for mountains, without explicit sortal, the masculine definite determiner 
matches the masculine gender of the German sortal Berg ‘mountain’ and obviously is 
indicative of its presence: 
 
(57) a. der Fujiyama, der 
        b. der Vesuv, der  
        c. der Etna, der 
 
The choice of type 2 names for mountains is rather strict. Just knowing that ‘Kailash’ is the 
name for a sacred mountain in Tibet, speakers have very firm intuitions that the name cannot 





(58) a. * Man darf Kailash nicht besteigen. 
            ‘One is not allowed to climb Kailash.’ 
        b. * Kailash ist heilig. 
             ‘Kailash is sacred.’ 
(59) a. Man darf den Kailash nicht besteigen.  
           ‘One is not allowed to climb the Kailash.’ 
       b. Der Kailash ist heilig. 
           ‘The Kailash is sacred.’ 
 
The definite determiner is not obligatory with type 2 names, though, when they are used as 
vocatives:  
 
(60) (*Der) Kailash, endlich erblicke ich dich! 
       ‘(The) Kailash, finally I see you!’ 
 
Also in the predicate position of small-clause complements of verbs of calling may type 2 
names occur without determiner:  
                                                            
34 There are certain sorts of names for mountains that are exceptions to the generalization. Names for alps, for 
example, may be feminine (die Jungfrau, die Dent Blanche) or neutral (das Wiesmies) Such names should be 
considered idiomatic. There are also certain German names for places that come with a definite determiner and 





(61) Er nannte den Berg ‘Kailash’ / ‘den Kailash’. 
       ‘He called the mountain Kailash / the Kailash.’ 
 
Whether a determiner appears depends on whether the calling act is directed toward the 
referent, involving a vocative use of the name, as in (62a), or whether it makes reference to it 
in the third person, as in (62b): 
 
(62) a. Er wandte sich an den Berg als ‘Kailash’. 
          ‘He addressed the mountain as ‘Kailash’.’ 
      b. Er bezog sich auf den Berg als ‘der Kailash’. 
          ‘He referred to the mountain as ‘the Kailash’’. 
 
     Examples of German names for lakes containing an explicit sortal (possibly from a 
different language) are der Bodensee, der Zuricher See, der Lago Maggiore. Other names for 
lakes require the masculine definite determiner, whose gender matches the gender of  
the sortal noun See ‘lake’. Again, names for lakes not familiar to a speaker trigger clear 
intuitions that they must go with the masculine definite determiner in argument position. 
Thus, just knowing that Mansarovar is a name for a lake (the lake next to mount Kailash, 
which is equally sacred), speakers know that the name can be used in argument position only 
with the masculine definite determiner: 
 
(63) der Mansarovarsee / der Mansarovar / der See Mansarovar  
       ‘the Mansarovar lake / the Mansarovar / the lake Mansarovar’ 
(64) a. I will * Mansarovar / ok den Mansarovar sehen. 
           ‘I want to see Mansarovar / the Mansarovar.’ 
       b. * Mansarovar / ok Der Mansarovar ist ebenso heilig wie der Berg Kailash. 
           ‘Mansarovar is equally sacred as the mountain Kailash.’ 
 
     In English, names for lakes and mountains are not type 2 names (Lake Garda / * the 
Gardalake, Mount Vesuvius / *the Vesuvius). This illustrates that the choice among type 1 and 
type 2 names for particular kinds of entities is language-specific. 
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     Names for temples are type 2 names in both German and English. For a fairly familiar 




(65) Wir haben * Parthenon / ok den Parthenon / ok  den Parthenontempel besichtigt. 
       ‘We have visited Parthenon / the Parthenon / the Parthenon temple.’ 
 




   Unlike type 1 names, type 2 names always select d-pronouns and support plural anaphora: 
 
(66) der Kailash, der heilig ist    
        ‘the Kailash, which is sacred’ 
(67) Hans will den Kailash und den Mansarovar sehen. Maria will sie auch sehen. 
       ‘John wants to see the Kailash and the Mansarovar. Mary wants to see them too. ‘ 
 
     Concerning the syntactic structure of type 2 names, I will simply assume that the overt or 
silent full sortal noun forms the head of a compound as in (69a) and (69b): 
 
(68) a. der [Mansarovar [see]N]NP 
       b. der [Mansarovar [e]N]NP 
 
Such a compound structure is obligatory when forming new type 2 names whose sortal is not 
understood from the context, for example names for famous stones (der Hopediamand ‘the 
hopediamond’, der Rockefellersmaragd ‘the Rockfelleremerald’).
37
 
                                                            
35 It is remarkable that names for churches and for temples are treated so differently in one and the same 
language. In German, names for churches are type 1 names, whereas names for temples are type 2 names. Names 
for temples are less integrated into German than names for temples, presumably because of the dominance of 
Christianity in German culture. 
 
36 There are some yet to be explained differences between the construction with an overt sortal and the one with 
an unpronounced sortal. Thus the plural is possible in the former, but not the latter: 
 
(i) a. die Tempel Houriaji und Toji 
        ‘the temples Houriaji and Toji’ 
     b. * die Houriaji und Toji 
         ‘the (plur) Houriaji and Toji’ 
 
This suggests that a silent head noun must be singular and cannot be plural. 
 
37 French uses close appositions instead: le diamond hope, l’emeraud Rockefeller. 
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   The sortal in type 2 names can hardly be considered a light noun, given the variety and 
culture-specificity of the sortals they involve. This may present a difficulty for the 
generalization that only light nouns, not full nouns, can remain silent without antecedent 
(Kayne 2005). There is a plausible extension of the notion of antecedent, though, allowing an 
antecedent for a silent full noun to be found not just in the preceding discourse context, but 
also as an activated concept in the community that forms the background of the conversation  
     Why do type 2 names select d-pronouns and support plural anaphora? There is a double 
reason for that: first the presence of the definite determiner and second the presence of the 
sortal head noun, which is clearly count, given its overt version. 
     Type 2 names differ syntactically from close appositions (Jackendoff 1984): 
 
(69) the poet Goethe 
 
Unlike in type 2 names, in close appositions the head noun is obligatory. Moreover, there are 
constraints on the head noun of close appositions not shared by type 2 names. For example, 
with person names, the head noun of a close apposition may not just be a sortal, but has to 
describe a professional role (??? the person Goethe). There is a natural explanation for that if 
a type 1 name occurs in a close apposition together with its silent light noun, so that (69) is in 
fact: 
 
(70) the poet [Goethe PERSON] 
 
It is a plausible general constraint that the head noun of a close apposition has to be a more 
specific sortal than the light noun that is part of the type 1 name. This is the case for nouns 
describing professional roles as in (70). Why then is the close apposition die Stadt Berlin ‘the 
city of Berlin’ is fine?  That is because Stadt is more specific than PLACE, the light noun that 




This paper has argued that the light nouns are that part of light quantifiers in English, German 
and other languages are also part of certain types of proper names, namely type 1 names, 
which in German include names for persons, places, houses, as well as productive names. 
Light nouns display a countability distinction, with THING, PLACE, and TIME siding with 
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mass (non-count) nouns and PERSON and HOUSE with count nouns. This distinction 
between the two sorts of light nouns explains puzzling differences in the behavior among type 
1 names regarding the selection of relative pronouns and the ability to support plural 
anaphora.  
     Light nouns are not generally sortals, that is, nouns that convey the identity conditions of 
types of entities. In particular, THING and PLACE comprise a range of sortal concepts 
(material object, artifact, number, expression type, city, country, continent) and thus would 
only have the status of ‘dummy sortals’. Type 1 names are distinguished from type 2 names, 
which do not involve a light noun, but contain a specific silent or overt full sortal noun in a 
different syntactic structure. 
    What does the presence of light nouns in names mean for the semantics of names? One 
conclusions that can be drawn from the discussion of the role of light nouns in type 1 names is 
this. Since light nouns in type 1 names are not generally sortals, giving the identity conditions 
of the object the name stands for, they underspecify the type of entity being referred to and 
thus are not suited for the role of sortals that some philosophers took to be part of the meaning 
of names (Geach 1957, Dummett 1973). They contrast in that respect with the sortal nouns 
that are part of type 2 names. The function of light nouns in type 1 names thus is a somewhat 
different one. Note that the view about names that has become standard in philosophy of 
language generally does not make use of sortals; it simply says that names refer in virtue of a 
causal-historical chain involving previous uses of the name or else a referent-fixing schema 
that goes along with a productive process of name formation.   
 
Appendix: The predicativist theory of names and the mass status of place names and 
productive names 
 
This paper has presupposed the standard view about proper names: as referential terms they 
stand for the same individual in different circumstances of evaluation, based on a causal-
historical chain (for non-productive names) and a conventional naming schema (for 
productive names).  The mass status of German place names and productive names was then 
attributed to the mass status of the light nouns that make up a silent component of such name. 
There is an alternative to the semantics of names that has been discussed in the recent 
philosophical literature, namely predicativist theory (Fara 2011, 2015, Matushansky 2008). 
On the predicativist theory, names, when forming referential terms, act as part of a definite 
description with an unpronounced definite determiner, referring to the contextually unique 
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object bearing the property expressed by the name (being called ‘N’ or standing in a suitable 
contextually given naming relation to ‘N’). This theory appears to offer a simpler account of 
the mass status of place names in German. German place names would be based on common 
nouns that would themselves be mass rather than count, instead of being attributed to the mass 
status of the silent light noun that forms part of the name. There are a range of problems, 
though, for that view.  
      First of all, there is a general issue of linguistic plausibility for the predicativist view, 
which has been elaborated in the literature, in particular by Jeshion (2017) and Hinzen (2015). 
     Second, it is not clear how predicativism would explain the mass status of productive 
names. In fact it is not clear how the predicativist view applies to productive names in the first 
place. 
      Third, predicativism would have a hard time explaining why place names, if they are just 
common nouns, should classify as mass. Cumulativity and divisiveness, commonly 
considered defining characteristics of mass nouns in extensional mereological theories 
(Pelletier / Schubert 1989, 2003), certainly do not hold for place names: a neighborhood of 
Berlin is not called ‘Berlin’ again and if there was a city called ‘Berlin’ in the US, the German 
and the American cities would be ‘two Berlins’ and not form a single plurality called ‘Berlin’. 
In fact, when names are used as common nouns (derivatively), they clearly are treated as 
count rather than mass (the two Naples, a second Naples). The problem does not arise on the 
present view, which traces the mass status of place names to the mass status of the silent noun 
PLACE rather than the name with its denotation by itself. 
     Fourth, there are linguistic differences between common nouns and names when used as 
predicates of small-clause complements of verbs of calling. Matushansky (2008) took it to be 
syntactic evidence for the predicativist theory that (1a) is syntactically parallel to the small-
clause construction in (1b): 
 
(1) a. Mary called John ‘Bill’. 
      b. Mary called John a fool. 
 
(1a) appears to require the name to make the same sort of semantic contribution as an 
ordinary predicate such as a fool in the small clause in (1b), namely attributing a property of 
the sort ‘being called ‘Bill’ (or ‘standing in a suitable contextually given naming relation R to 
the name ‘Bill’) (Matushansky 2008). Despite their similarities, however, (1a) and (1b) are 
not entirely on a par. Both (1a) and (1b) describe acts of attribution, but the acts are different 
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in type, involving different conditions of satisfaction and different roles of the small-clause 
predicates. These differences manifest themselves syntactically in German, namely in the 
choice of different proforms for the small-clause predicates. In German, predicational nennen 
‘to call’ as in (1a) goes along with the proforms was ‘what’ and das ‘that’ for the small-clause 
predicate, as seen in (2a, b), whereas appellative nennen as in (1b) goes along with the 
proforms wie ‘how’ and so ‘so’, as seen in (3a, b): 
 
(2) a. Hans nannte ihn einen Esel. Maria hat ihn das / * so auch genannt. 
         ‘John called him a donkey. Mary called him that too.’ 
     b. Was / * Wie hat Maria ihn genannt? Sie nannte ihn einen Esel. 
         ‘How / What did Mary call him ? She called him a donkey’. 
(3) a. Er nannte sie ‘Susi’. Er haette sie nicht so / * das nennen sollen. 
          ‘He called her Susi. He should not have called her so / that.’ 
      b. Wie / * Was hat er sie genannt? Er nannte sie ‘Susi’. 
          ‘How / What did he call her? He called her ‘Susi’.’ 
 
Wie and how are also the proforms to replace als (‘as’)-phrases, as below: 
 
(4) a. Er sprach ‘Küsschen’ so aus. 
          he pronounced ‘Kusschen’ so 
          ‘He pronounced ‘Küsschen’ that way.’ 
      b. Wie sprach er ‘Küsschen’ aus?  
          ‘How did he pronounce ‘Küsschen’?’ 
 
This indicates that names as small-clause predicates with verbs of calling do not contribute a 
property in the way ordinary small-clause predicates do. They may better be considered pure 
quotations, but now in a predicative function.
38
  The semantic parallelism between (1a) and 
(1b) then consists in that the act described by the verb of calling is one of attribution of a 
name (expression type) in (1a) and attribution of a property in (1b). The satisfaction 
conditions of the former consist in John having the name, those of the latter in John having 
the property. Predicative occurrences of names do not require a property-denotation for 
                                                            
38 The predicativist theory is also motivated by ‘common noun’ occurrences of names as in several Marys or 
every Kennedy. But see Jeshion (2017) for an account of common noun uses of proper names in terms of 




names, but can be treated as pure quotations. Note that pure quotations can also occur after 




(5) a. John treats Bill as a brother. 
      b. John pronounced ‘Küsschen’ as ‘Kuchen’. 
 
Predicative uses of names with verbs of calling thus motivate a more general account of 
predicative quotation rather than a treatment of names as common nouns. 
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